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A study of the impact of the 1930s World Depression on Southwest
China intersects with two major controversies in modern Chinese
economic history. First, there is still substantial disagreement over
the severity of the impact of the Depression on China. The `tradi-
tional' interpretation inside China has focused on the `bankruptcy'
of the economy in the 1930s (of which the Depression was one but
not the only cause).
2 While many aspects of the `bankruptcy' and
`stagnation' theses have more recently been discarded or modi®ed by
Chinese scholars, recognition is still made of the gravity of the crisis
of the 1930s: China's leading historian of its modern economy, Wu
Chengming, writes in the third volume of the History of Chinese Capit-
alism: `The economic crisis of 1932±1935 was, with the exception of
the wars of invasion launched by foreign countries, the single most
severe blow to the Chinese economy'.
3 Most Western scholars have
1 The research for this paper was carried out partly with the help of an Australian
Research Council grant which enabled me to go to China to collect materials and
discuss the issues with Chinese scholars. I would also like to thank scholars at
Yunnan and Sichuan Universities and the Academies of Social Sciences in the two
provinces as well as at Nankai University and the Institute of Economics at the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing for giving me much help and enlight-
enment on this topic. In addition I would like to thank Beverley Hooper and Anne-
Marie Medcalf for helpful suggestions and comments on earlier drafts.
2 See, for example, Zhongguo renmin daxue zhengzhi jingji xue xi `Zhongguo
jindai jingji shi' bianxie zu, Zhongguo jindai jingji shi (Economic history of modern
China) (Beijing: Renmin chuban she, 1978), vol. 2, pp. 34, 48±9.
3 Xu Dixin and Wu Chengming (eds), Xin minzhuzhuyi geming shiqi de Zhongguo
zibenzhuyi (Chinese capitalism in the period of the new democratic revolution)
Zhongguo zibenzhuyi fazhan shi (The history of Chinese capitalism), vol. 3 (Beijing:
Renmin chuban she, 1993), p. 5. Wu refers to the years 1932±35 because China
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also accepted that the 1930s saw a serious economic crisis in China:
David Faure has gone so far as to argue that there was a funda-
mental discontinuity in the Chinese rural economy caused by the
impact of the Depression.
4
On the other hand, a revisionist interpretation is now being pro-
moted by some scholars, of whom Loren Brandt puts the case most
strongly. Brandt argues that continued growth in money supply, des-
pite falling prices, indicates strong industrial and commercial activ-
ity, a contention which is supported by the available ®gures for indus-
trial output. He concludes `that the Chinese economy weathered the
external shocks of the 1930s remarkably well and that there was no
contraction in economic activity'.
5 While some of the bases of
Brandt's argument, especially Rawski's estimates of money supply,
have been controversial,
6 other aspects, such as the continued growth
of industrial output, are widely accepted. Indeed, one of the few ser-
ious studies on cyclical movements in the Chinese economy has the
whole of the early 1930s as part of an upturn.
7




ture of what was happening in China during that period.
The other key controversy is over the degree of integration of the
Chinese economy, both internally and in relation to the world eco-
nomy. Was China largely a single national economy, responding to
a single set of prices basically derived from the world market?
8 Or
was partially protected from the impact of the Depression up to 1931 because of
the fall in the price of silver.
4 See David Faure, `The Plight of the Farmers: A Study of the Rural Economy of
Jiangnan and the Pearl River Delta, 1870±1937', Modern China 11.1 (Jan. 1985):
26±31.
5 Loren Brandt and Thomas J. Sargent, `Interpreting New Evidence about China
and U.S. Silver Purchases', Journal of Monetary Economics 23 (Jan. 1989): 31±4, 46±
7; Brandt's arguments won over an initially skeptical Ramon Myers, see `The World
Depression and the Chinese Economy, 1930±6', pp. 253±78 in Ian Brown (ed.), The
Economies of Africa and Asia in the Inter-war Depression (London: Routledge, 1989).
6 Milton Friedman, `Franklin D. Roosevelt, Silver, and China', Journal of Political
Economy 100.1 (February 1992): 62±83; see also the reply by Thomas G. Rawski,
`Milton Friedman, Silver and China', Journal of Political Economy 101.4 (Aug. 1993):
755±8.
7 Yu Jianwei, `Zhongguo jingji fazhan zhong de zhongchangqi podong' (Long and
medium term ¯uctuations in China's economic development), Tianfu xinlun (Tianfu
papers) 1989.4 (1989): 30.
8 See Loren Brandt, Commercialization and Agricultural Development: Central and East-
ern China, 1870±1937 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 25±37.SOUTHWEST CHINA AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 699
was it a series of weakly linked regional markets?
9 This study focuses,
in as far as is possible, on two of Skinner's macroregions, the Upper
Yangzi and Yun-Gui, and some of the questions asked here will
throw light on the extent to which those regions were linked with
the Chinese economy as a whole. Data limitations mean that most
statements can only be made relating to provinces, but in this case
there was a relatively close correspondence between Sichuan and
the Upper Yangzi,
10 and also between Yunnan and Guizhou and the
Yun-Gui macroregion.
11
The impact of the Great Depression on the Southwest has been
relatively little studied in China. Scholars in both Kunming and
Chengdu have understandably concentrated on the boost given to
regional development during the anti-Japanese War. Thus there was
some surprise, even puzzlement, when I raised the issue with them.
Nevertheless in terms of the `normal' operation of the pre-
Communist economy this question remains important and worth
addressing.
In order to establish a starting-point for the analysis, this paper
begins by examining the ways in which the economies of the two
macroregions were integrated with the wider Chinese or world eco-
nomies in the early twentieth century. The next section examines
the impact of the Depression on the region's export commodities,
linkage effects from the decline of those commodities, price effects
¯owing through the economy from the rest of China and income
effects resulting from those changes in prices. The paper ®nally com-
pares the impact of the Depression with other factors, notably polit-
ical upheavals involving local warlords and climatic factors such as
those leading to the Sichuan famines of the mid 1930s.
9 See G. William Skinner, `Regional Urbanization in Nineteenth Century China',
in G. William Skinner (ed.), The City in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1977), p. 217; for the controversy on the 20th century economy, see
Barbara Sands and Ramon H. Myers, `The Spatial Approach to Chinese History: A
Test', Journal of Asian Studies 45.4 (Aug. 1986): 721±43, and the two responses,
Daniel Little and Joseph W. Esherick, `Testing the Testers: A Reply to Barbara
Sands and Ramon Myers's Critique of G. William Skinner's Regional Systems
Approach to China', Journal of Asian Studies 48.1 (Feb. 1989): 90±9 and William
Lavely, `The Spatial Approach to Chinese History: Illustrations from North China
and the Upper Yangzi', Journal of Asian Studies 48.1 (Feb. 1989): 100±13.
10 The Upper Yangzi macroregion excluded the far west of Sichuan, and included
relatively small areas of southern Gansu, northern Guizhou and northeastern
Yunnan. In this paper data limitations mean that most of the statements refer to
the province of Sichuan. See Skinner, `Regional Urbanization', p. 215.
11 The Yun-Gui macroregion included all of Yunnan except the far northwest
and far northeast, and most of Guizhou except for a strip along the north and aTIM WRIGHT 700
Economic Structure of the Southwest
Southwest China related to the rest of the country as periphery to
core. Average incomes were lower than elsewhere, and the economy
was even more reliant than was the rest of China on primary produc-
tion rather than manufacturing or services. This was re¯ected in a
pattern of trade whereby the region exported primary products and
imported manufactured goods.
The section goes on to analyse other indications of integration
with the rest of the economy, for example price movements and
instances of arbitrage.
The nature of the two macroregions within the Southwest varied
considerably however. The Upper Yangzi had been a major economic
and cultural centre of China for two millennia.
12 It was relatively
highly developed economically, and indeed Adshead argues that
Sichuan was the `best' province in China in the nineteenth century,
though its position, absolute and relative, deteriorated rapidly in the
last decade of the Empire and under the Republic.
13 It also was rela-
tively commercialized, with a developed market system centred on
a regional metropolis (by the twentieth century) at Chongqing:
14 a
contemporary source estimates that 60% of the province's grain pro-
duction was marketed, only 40% used directly for subsistence.
15
Farmers reacted ¯exibly to market signals, shifting plans for crop
cultivation according to movements in relative prices.
16
In contrast Yun-Gui was much more of a frontier zone. Full integ-
ration into the Chinese empire little if at all predated the eighteenth
century, and the marketing system remained imperfect right up to
the twentieth century. While Kunming was probably the most
important single centre, it did not form the same sort of hub for the
somewhat larger area to the east. Nevertheless, much the largest part of both prov-
inces lay within the macroregion.
12 For the formation of the Upper Yangzi macroregion see Paul J. Smith, `Com-
merce, Agriculture and Core Formation in the Upper Yangzi, 2 A.D. to 1948', Late
Imperial China 9.1 (June 1988): 1±78.
13 S. A. M. Adshead, Province and Politics in Late Imperial China: Viceregal Government
in Szechwan, 1898±1911 (London: Curzon Press, 1984), chs I and V.
14 G. William Skinner, `Cities and the Hierarchy of Local Systems', in Skinner,
The City in Late Imperial China, pp. 288±98.
15 Sichuan jingji yuekan (Sichuan economic monthly) (hereafter SJYK) 3.4/5
(April/May 1935): 168.
16 Mo Zhongxie, Sichuan sheng yancao diaocha (Investigation of tobacco in Sichuan)
(Chongqing: Sichuan sheng nongye gaijin suo, 1940), p. 5.SOUTHWEST CHINA AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 701
region as did Chongqing in the Upper Yangzi.
17 The region's poor
communications made it dif®cult to export bulk products,
18 though
this problem could be overcome if the commodity was of suf®cient
importance, as was copper in the Qing dynasty. MiningÐmainly of
copper in the Imperial period, mainly of tin in the Republican
periodÐplayed a major role in the development of the region,
though there is little sign from the statistics that industry contrib-
uted a greater proportion of total product there than elsewhere. In
some ways Yun-Gui was an economic colony of Sichuan: when it
developed its modern match industry, skilled workers were recruited
from already existing enterprises in Sichuan.
19
Economic Structure and Levels of Trade
The two Southwest macroregions had relatively backward economies,
with a per capital `national income' around two-thirds the national
average. Dependence on agriculture was even greater than in the
rest of the country, and the level of industrialization lower. These
basic facts emerge both in the ®gures for the 1920s and 1930s and in
the somewhat more reliable data for 1952. Estimates for the pre-war
period in Table 1, which is based on pioneering work by Chris Bram-
all,
20 show that agriculture contributed over 65% (more than 10%o f
which was opium) to total product, industry (mainly salt in Sichuan,
tin in Yunnan) less than 6%. If the ®gures are robust enough to
allow such a calculation, they suggest levels of per capita product or
income 74% (for Sichuan) and 57% (for Yun-Gui) of the national
average.
21 Similar conclusions can be drawn from the somewhat
17 For the formation of the Yun-Gui macroregion, see James Lee, `Food Supply
and Population Growth in Southwest China, 1250±1850', Journal of Asian Studies
41.4 (Aug. 1982): 711±46.
18 Wang Fuming, `Jindai Yunnan quyu shichang chutan (1875±1911)' (A prelim-
inary discussion of the regional market of modern Yunnan, 1875±1911), Zhongguo
jingji shi yanjiu (Studies in Chinese economic history) 1990.(1990): 103.
19 Lu Fuchu, chief ed., Kunming shi zhi changbian (Kunming city gazetteer, full
edition), 13 vols (Kunming: Kunming shi zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, 1983±84), vol.
11,p .44.
20 Chris Bramall, Living Standards in Sichuan, 1931±1978 (London: Contemporary
China Institute, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London,
1989), pp. 75±85.
21 K. C. Yeh, `China's National Income, 1931±36', in Chi-ming Hou and Tzong-
shian Yu (eds), Modern Chinese Economic History: Proceedings of the Conference on ModernTIM WRIGHT 702
TABLE 1
Economic Structure of Sichuan and Yunnan, late 1920±1930s
Sector Sichuan Yun-Gui
Million 1993 % Million 1933 %
Ch$ Ch$
Agriculture 1588 65.8 681 70.7
Food crops 977 40.5 379 39.3
rice 554 23.0 218 22.6
Cash crops 494 20.5 210 21.8
silk cocoons 31 1.3
tobacco 11 0.52 3 2 .3
tong oil 80 .3
opium 260 10.8 125 13.0
Livestock 188 7.89 2 9 .5
Industry 138 5.73 7 3 .8
coal 20 .11 0 .1
salt 92 3.81 1 1 .1
tin 14 1.4
reeled silk and silk 30 .1
cloth
Others 615 25.5 246 25.5
Total 2412 100 963 100
Population (millions) 56 29
Per capita product 43.07 33.21
(yuan)
For details and sources, see Appendix I.
more reliable 1952 ®gures shown in Table 2, although they may
substantially understate the degree of backwardness of the two
regions in the 1930s because of their relatively rapid development
during the war as base areas for the Guomindang.
This basic economic structure was re¯ected in the region's pattern
of external economic relations. Exports were mainly primary or semi-
processed goodsÐmost importantly, opium, silk, tong oil and tinÐ
and imports predominantly manufactured goods, especially cotton
yarn. Tables 3 and 4 detail the structure of legal exports through
the Maritime Customs from Sichuan and Yunnan (Guizhou had no
ports open to foreign trade) respectively.
22
Chinese Economic History, Academic Sinica (Taipei: Institute of Economics, Academic
Sinica, 1979), p. 104.
22 These ®gures only include legal exports registered by the Maritime Customs
through the ports of Wanxian and Chongqing in Sichuan, and Mengzi, Simao and
Tengyue in Yunnan; they do not include the quite important exports from SichuanSOUTHWEST CHINA AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 703
TABLE 2
The Southwest in the Chinese Economy, 1952
Province Average per capita Share in `national' income
`national income'
(1952 yuan) Industry Agriculture
National Average 102.51 9 .55 7 .7
Sichuan 57.31 4 .26 9 .7
Yunnan 62.41 1 .96 8 .2
Guizhou 54.81 2 .66 8 .9
Sources: Guojia tongji ju guomin jingji pingheng tongji si, Guomin shouru tongji ziliao
huibian, 1949±1985 (Collected statistics on national income) (Beijing: Zhongguo
tongji chuban she, 1987), pp. 10±11, 341±2, 355±6, 365±6; of®cial population
®gures.
TABLE 3
Major Legal Exports from and Imports to Sichuan before and during the Depression
Exports Imports
late 1920s: mid 1930s: late 1920s:
average average average 1926±30
1926±30 1934±35
Item Ch$ % Ch$ % Item Ch$ %
million million million
Silk and silk 15.82 5 .71 .84 .8 Cotton 37.64 4 .9
goods yarn
Tong oil 9.91 6 .29 .92 7 .2 Cotton 2.22 .6
cloth
Linen 8.01 3 .00 .20 .6 Kerosene 1.72 .0
Medicinal 5.69 .13 .28 .8 Cigarettes 1.51 .8
herbs etc
Skins and 3.55 .72 .46 .7
leather goods
Pig bristles 2.94 .75 .71 5 .7
Tobacco 1.62 .71 .64 .4
Sugar 0.40 .62 .05 .5 Others 40.84 8 .7
Total 61.43 6 .4 Total 83.8 100
Notes: trade values have been converted from Haiguan taels at 1.558 yuan per
Haiguan tael; because of a change in reporting methods, import ®gures for the
1930s are not comparable; the `other' category here is merely a residual.
Source: Gan Cisen, Zuijin sishiwunian lai Sichuan sheng jinchukou maoyi tongji
(Guangxu shiqinian zhi Minguo ershisinian 1891±1935) (Statistics on Sichuan's import
and export trade, 1891±1935) (Chongqing: Minsheng shiye gongsi jingji yanjiu
suo, 1936), Tables 1, 6, 7.
to Northwest China and beyond and to Yunnan, nor the even more important ship-
ments of opium, mainly down the Yangzi from Sichuan or through Guangxi to
Guangzhou from Yun-Gui.TIM WRIGHT 704
TABLE 4
Major Legal Exports from and Imports to Yunnan before the Depression
(average 1926±30)
Exports Imports
Item Ch$ million % Item Ch$ million %
Tin 13.50 71.6 Cotton yarn 15.33 48.1
Silk 1.89 10.0 Kerosene 1.16 3.6
Skins/leather 1.43 7.6 Raw cotton 0.87 2.7
Others 2.04 10.8 Others 14.52 45.5
Total 18.86 100 Total 31.88 100
Notes: these trade values have been converted from Haiguan taels at 1.558 yuan
per Haiguan tael; the `other' category here is merely a residual.
Source: Zhongyang yanjiu yuan shehui kexue yanjiu suo, Yunnan zhi maoyi (Trade of
Yunnan) (n.p., Dec. 1939), pp. 67, 71, 89.
The Major Lines of Trade
The major trade commodities and the commercial and productive
structures that supported them formed the most important links
between the Southwest and the external economy. The rise (or fall)
of these lines of trade was a mechanism through which the wealth
of the region was increased (or decreased) through its links to the
outside world. In this period, exports from the Southwest consisted
heavily of raw materials, agricultural or mineral, or relatively simple
handicraft manufactures.
The Upper Yangzi, with its relatively diversi®ed economy, had a
variety of major trading items, including some manufactures, with
silk and tong oil being the most important, and `mountain products',
tobacco, sugar and linen also playing a role, especially in the overland
trade.
Silk was Sichuan's major legal export for much of the early twenti-
eth century, making up about 25% of the total throughout the 1920s.
The region was a major, though not a dominant, player in the
national silk industry and provided on average about 16% of the silk
exported through Shanghai.
23 Much silk was consumed within the
province, and some, either from west Sichuan or lower quality silk
from the east of the province, exported south to Yunnan and thence
Thailand or Burma; thus silk produced in the Jiading area in the
23 Xu Xinwu et al., Zhongguo jindai saosi gongye shi (A history of the Chinese silk
reeling industry) (Shanghai: Renmin chuban she, 1990), p. 247.SOUTHWEST CHINA AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 705
south of the province was less tied in to the Shanghai market than
that produced further north.
24
The silk trade and industry provided a livelihood for very large
numbers of Sichuan farm households. After a long history in the
province,
25 the industry expanded very considerably at the beginning
of the century, going some way to easing the plight of the province
following the opium suppression campaigns of the 1900s.
26 Accord-
ing to the Sichuan Economic Monthly, in the 1930s some `tens of mil-
lions' of farmers relied directly or indirectly on silk for an important
part of their income:
27 even in a minor producing centre like Qiong-
lai, Southwest of Chengdu, the production of 1 million catties of
cocoons a year bene®ted 100,000 households.
28 Silk was the main
cash crop in most areas of the Sichuan region except for the Tuo
River basin.
29 Production was spread throughout the province, par-
ticularly in the northern part centring on Santai (Tongchuan) and
Nanchong (Shunqing). While Santai was formally in the Chengdu
economic sphere,
30 convenient river transport meant that most of its
exports went to Chongqing, and its industry was developed with a
view to that market.
31
Tong oil, which became Sichuan'sÐand indeed China'sÐmajor
export by the 1930s, was, by contrast, largely a twentieth-century
phenomenon, developing rapidly from the 1910s for Wanxian and
the 1920s for Chongqing. By the 1930s Sichuan was China's major
24 `Sericulture in Szechwan', Chinese Economic Journal 15.5 (Nov. 1934); 545.
25 In the southern Song, silk was one of the main items in the commercial expan-
sion which began the shift in the centre of gravity of the Upper Yangzi region from
the Chengdu area to Chongqing and the Yangzi valley; see Smith, `Commerce,
Agriculture and Core Formation', pp. 46, 57.
26 Kubota Bunji, `Shinmatsu Senhoku sanshigyo Ã no tenkai' (Development of the
silk-reeling industry in Northern Sichuan in the Late Qing), Rekishigaku kenkyu Ã 331
(Dec. 1967): 31; Lillian M. Li, China's Silk Trade: Traditional Industry in the Modern
World, 1842±1937 (Cambridge, Mass: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard Uni-
versity, 1981), pp. 115±16.
27 SJYK 5.4 (April 1936): 21; this number should not be taken literally.
28 Sichuan Yuebao (Sichuan monthly) (hereafter SYB) 2.6 (June 1933): 58.
29 Hu Huanyong, Sichuan dili (The geography of Sichuan) (Chongqing:
Zhengzhong shuju, 1940), p. 37.
30 Skinner, `Cities', p. 289.
31 Ibid., p. 291; Wang Di, Kuachu fengbi de shijieÐchangjiang shangyou quyu shehui
yanjiu (1644±1911) (Breaking out of a closed worldÐstudies of the society of the
Upper Yangzi macroregion, 1644±1911) (Beijing: Zonghua shuju, 1993), pp. 36±7;
Peng Zeyi (ed.), Zhongguo jindai shougongye shi ziliao (1840±1949) (Materials on the
history of modern China's handicraft industries, 1840±1949), 4 vols (Beijing:
Zhonghua shuju, 1962), vol. 2,p .364.TIM WRIGHT 706
producer, and accounted for around one-third of total output.
32 Pro-
duction was concentrated in the east of the province, in the highland
areas along the Yangzi. Unlike in the case of silk, for which the
domestic market was primary, tong oil production was almost all for
export, mostly to the United States, and during the 1920s and 1930s
a series of new ®nancial institutions established for the trade by
Chinese banks enabled a much higher level of integration between
Sichuan and the Shanghai and overseas markets.
33
Farm households moved into tong oil production from the early
1920s as increasing demand from the United States led to rising
prices and the prospect of good pro®ts.
34 A vivid picture of how the
trade brought prosperity to many rural areas is provided by a report
on Xuyong (Yongning) in the far south of the province: originally
little tong oil was produced there, but competition at far-off Wanxian
forced up prices, impelling merchants to go as far as Xuyong in
search of tong nuts. By the late 1920s the incomes produced for
farmers were so high that even good land was put down to tong trees,
while a substantial local pressing industry also emerged, with no less
than 203 establishments involved.
35
The Upper Yangzi exported a number of other major primary
products. Tobacco and sugar also ®gured prominently in the Mari-
time Customs records, but were probably even more important in
the overland trade with other parts of China. Tobacco cultivation
was widespread but concentrated to the north and west of
Chengdu.
36 Trade ¯owed down the Tuo and Yangzi rivers to con-
sumers in those areas, as well as further west along the Min River;
lesser amounts went overland to Shaanxi or Xikang, or south to
Yunnan.
37 Sugar production was heavily concentrated in the lower
Tuo valley, with that produced in the Jianzhou trading system mostly
32 William T. Rowe, `Tung Oil in Central China: The Rise and Fall of a Regional
Export Staple', pp. 355±84 in Yung-san Lee and Ts'ui-jung Liu (eds), China's Market
Economy in Transition (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1990); SJYK 5.6 (June 1936): 12±
13.
33 Evan Erlanson, `Domestic Banks in Economic Development: Marketing Net-
works and Financial Technologies in Prewar China', Twentieth-Century China 24.1
(Nov. 1998): 67±118.
34 SJYK 3.3 (March 1935): 59.
35 SYB 7.6 (Dec. 1935): 100.
36 Mo, Sichuan sheng yencao,p .3; Jin Shanbao and Jiang Yao, `Sichuan dama yancao
kaocha baogao' (Report on the hemp and tobacco industries in Sichuan), in Xinan
jingji diaocha hezuo weiyuanhui, Sichuan jingji kaochatuan kaocha baogao: Nonglin
(Report of an economic investigation into Sichuan: Agriculture and Forestry)
(Chongqing: Duli chuban she, 1940), pp. 131±2.
37 Mo, Sichuan sheng yencao, pp. 27±8.SOUTHWEST CHINA AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 707
exported northwards to the Chengdu metropolis, that produced in
the Neijiang system going south to Luzhou and thence to Chong-
qing.
38 The growing trade brought prosperity to Neijiang owner-
cultivators in the early 1910s, before the warlord regimes disrupted
the trade and sharpened class divisions.
39
The major manufactured export, and that a handicraft product,
was linen. Production was heavily concentrated in the Tuo River
basin, particularly in Longchang and Rongchang in the Luzhou
regional city trading system, where the Bank of China estimated that
200,000 households bene®ted from the trade. Exports were a very
important component of sales: Korea was the main market, taking
in the late 1920s perhaps one-third of total output. Within China,
most was sold in the north, but Sichuan's lower costs allowed it to
develop a market even in south China, itself a linen producing area.
40
In contrast to Sichuan's more varied trade, legal exports of the
Yun-Gui region consisted almost exclusively of tin. Indeed, tin from
the Gejiu mines contributed between 80 and 90% of total exports
from Yunnan through the Maritime Customs. Traditionally, Yunnan
had been a much more important copper exporter (to the rest of
China) than a source of tin, the trade in which basically originated
in the 1890s, with its rapid expansion dating from the early 1910s.
41
Earnings from the trade were of course highly dependent on the
¯uctuating world tin price. While the impact of tin on the regional
economy was much more localized than in the case of the Upper
Yangzi handicraft products discussed above, it did make a contribu-
tion to the solution of rural unemployment by supporting 80±90,000
workers, and taxes on the metal played a key role in the provincial
®nances of Yunnan, contributing around 25% of total revenue in the
1930s.
42
38 Chongqing Zhongguo yinhang, Sichuan sheng zhi tang (The Sugar Industry in
Szechuan Province) (Chongqing: Zhongguo yinhang zong guanli chu jingji yanjiu
shi, 1934), pp. 84±5.
39 Wang Dongwei and Huang Jiangling, `Jiefang qian Neijiang ganzhe zhongzhi
ye gaikuang' (The Neijiang sugar industry before 1949), Sichuan wenshi ziliao xuanji
(Materials on Sichuan history) (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chuban she), 35(1985),
p. 178.
40 Chongqing Zhongguo yinhang, Sichuan sheng zhi xiabu (Szechuen Linen)
(Chongqing: Zhongguo yinhang zong guanli chu jingji yanjiu shi, 1936), pp. 19±20,
200, 213.
41 Zhang Xiaomei, Yunnan jingji (The economy of Yunnan) (Chongqing: Zhong-
guo guomin jingji yanjiu suo, 1942), J19,J 15.
42 Yang Shouchuan, `Jindai Dian xi chukou shulue' (A short account of tin exports
from modern Yunnan), Sixiang zhanxian (Ideological front) 1990.4 (Aug. 1990): 83±
8; `Yunnan kuangwu gaikuang' (Mining in Yunnan), Yunnan jianshe yuekan (YunnanTIM WRIGHT 708
Opium was, however, almost certainly the main item of trade for
both macroregions, though the trade does not appear in the statist-
ics. The opium suppression campaigns of the 1900s and 1910s
appear to have been quite successful, but there was a resurgence of
opium production from the early or mid 1920s, mostly attributed by
the Chinese sources to the need of warlords for a lucrative source of
®nance.
43 In any case by the late 1920s, the two regions had re-
emerged as the major opium producers in the country and the major
suppliers of opium to the Chinese market.
44
By the 1930s, opium played a major role in production and even
more in trade in the two macroregions. Because it was an illegal
product, information on its production and trade is scanty and estim-
ates of the level of activity vary widely. Jerome Chen opts for an
estimate of only 200,000 piculs for output in Sichuan.
45 In contrast,
Bramall estimates that 25% of the cultivated acreage grew opium
and that production was over 1 million piculs; thus he puts the con-
tribution of opium to the total provincial product at a massive
15%.
46 However, a provincial total of over 1 million is perhaps ques-
tionable: most of the estimates for Fouling, the largest production
area, are that 25±33% of sown acreage was committed to opium and
production was in the order of 50,000 piculs.
47 It is reasonable to
assume most other counties produced less. Taking also into account
an estimated output for the early 1900s of around 200,000 piculs, I
Construction Monthly) 1.1 (Jan. 1937): 60; Jing-Dian gonglu zhoulan choubei hui
Yunnan fen hui, Yunnan gaikuang (General survey of Yunnan) (1937), p. 52.
43 See, for example, the major economic history of modern China: Xu Dixin and
Wu Chengming (eds) Jiu minzhuzhuyi geming shiqi de Zhongguo zibenzhuyi (Chinese
capitalism in the period of the old democratic revolution) (Zhongguo zhibenzhuyi
fazhan shi, vol. 2) (Beijing: Renmin chuban she, 1990), p. 983, though this source
also points out that higher prices resulting from prohibition increased pro®ts in the
trade.
44 Wang Jinxiang, `Er, san shi niandai guonei yapian wenti' (The problem of
opium in China in the 1920s and 1930s), Minguo dang'an (Republican archives)
1992.2 (1992): 71. It would appear that the Northwest, the other major opium
producing area, produced only perhaps as much as Yunnan or Guizhou, and substan-
tially less than Sichuan. See British Foreign Of®ce Archives, Public Record Of®ce,
London, FO 371 (hereafter, FO 371), F1887/8/87, League of Nations Report for
1937.
45 Jerome Ch'en, The Highlanders of Central China: A History 1895±1937 (Armonk,
NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1992), p. 21.
46 Bramall, Living Standards,p .30.
47 FO371,F 3520/184/87, enclosure no. 2: McAmmond to Toller, 21 May 1930,
and F3485/184/87: Toller to Lampson, 26 May 1930; Su Zhiliang, Zhongguo dupin
shi (History of drugs in China) (Shanghai: Renmin chuban she, 1997), p. 343; Chen,
Highlanders,p .88; SYB 6.3 (March 1935): 142.SOUTHWEST CHINA AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 709
believe that the most likely level of production was around half a
million piculs. That is the ®gure used in Table 1, which thus suggests
opium `contributed' about 10% to total product.
Much of the opium was exported, with Fouling being the most
important trading centre:
48 estimates in the 1930s suggested that as
much as 7,000 tons (116,000 piculs) was shipped down the Yangzi
through Hankou.
49 As the trade was illegal, there is little information
on it, but the drug was probably less central to the trade of Sichuan's
bigger and more diverse economy than it was to Yun-Gui.
Yun-Gui was the main supplier of opium to the Chinese market
by the 1920s. According to the estimates in Table 1, production
made up a slightly higher proportion of provincial output than was
the case in the Upper Yangzi. In addition, opium provided most of
the region's foreign exchange and was central to the ®nancial well-
being of their governments. Yunnan, whose opium had the reputa-
tion of being the best in China,
50 produced several thousand tons a
year. Opium, as British Consul-General Harding reported, was
(apart from tin) `the only considerable product of the province on
the exportable supplies of which it depends for money to ®nance its
imports and to balance its budget'.
51 One estimate was that opium
exports amounted to Ch$20 million a year, more than double the
C$10 million de®cit on legal trade; local consumption was worth
Ch$30 million.
52 Guizhou also exported opium to the value of up to
Ch$50 million in return for imports of cotton yarn and goods of daily
use.
53
48 Robert A. Kapp, `Chungking as a Center of Warlord Power, 1926±1937', in
Mark Elvin and G. William Skinner (eds), The Chinese City Between Two Worlds
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), p. 157.
49 J. C. S. Hall, The Yunnan Provincial Faction, 1927±1937 (Canberra: Department
of Far Eastern History, Australian National University, 1976), pp. 126±7;a1930
estimate was 40,000 piculs, see United States State Department Central Files,
China: Internal Affairs, 893.114 (hereafter, US 893.114) Narcotics/ 178, American
Consul, Hankow, to Secretary of State, Con®dential Report, 12 December 1930.
50 Su, Zhongguo dupin shi,p .328.
51 FO371,F 4317/87/87, Harding to Cadogan, 6 June 1934.
52 Lu, Kunming shi zhi, vol. 12,p .368; see also Zhang, Yunnan jingji,P 1, and Hall,
The Yunnan Provincial Faction, ch. 5.
53 Tang Zaiyang, `Minguo shiqi Guizhou gongshangye gaikuang' (Industry and
commerce in Guizhou during the Republican period), Guizhou wenshi congkan
(Historical materials on Guizhou) 1987.2 (1987): 27; Zhou Chunyuan, He Chang-
feng and Zhang Xiangguang, Guizhou jindai shi (Modern history of Guizhou)
(Guiyang: Renmin chuban she, 1987), p. 185. This ®gure seems somewhat high, in
the light of the Yunnan ®gure and the estimates for value of output presented in
Table 1.TIM WRIGHT 710
How far farm households were attracted into opium cultivation by
its income-generating possibilities is not clear. Certainly most of the
literature stresses the way that governments, pressed for revenue,
forced farmers into cultivating opium by imposing taxes which could
only be paid through its cultivation.
54 But it could also be a pro®table
crop. Farmers in Li xian to the northwest of Chengdu began cultivat-
ing opium in the early 1920s when they saw the pro®ts to be made;
the resources generated by the crop allowed them to import farm
tools and draft animals to develop agricultural production.
55 Later,
too, farmers undertook and abandoned opium cultivation in response
to changes in its pro®tability: heavy demand for Fouling opium in
1936 induced many farmers to switch away from vegetable cultiva-
tion in the hope of making a pro®t.
56
In contrast to the raw material exports, the major imports into
the region were manufactured goods, most importantly cotton yarn,
of which some 100,000 bales were imported into Sichuan in the mid
1930s.
57 Similarly, about half of the imports into Yunnan recorded
by the Maritime Customs was accounted for by cotton yarn,
58 and up
to 70% by cotton goods as a whole.
59 As in the rest of China, machine
yarn, imported either from overseas or from modern Chinese mills
in Shanghai, became the basis for the handicraft weaving industry,
in the process commercializing the rural areas; even Chinese sources
say that the `dumping' of foreign yarn did not cause rural bankruptcy
in Sichuan, but rather stimulated a boom in rural household
weaving.
60
54 For Guizhou see FO371,F 4317/87/87, Harding to Cadogan, 6 June 1934; for
Sichuan see Kuang Shanji and Yang Shurong, `Sichuan junfa yu yapian' (Opium
and the Sichuan warlords), in Xinan junfa shi yanjiu hui, Xinan junfa shi yanjiu
congkan (Studies on the Southwest warlords) (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chuban she,
1985), pp. 250±1.
55 Sang Zihou, `Jiefang qian Li xian zhongzhi yapian de qingkuang' (Opium cul-
tivation in Li xian before 1949), in Sichuan wenshi ziliao xuanji 30 (1985), pp. 143,
153.
56 SJYK 7.5/6 (May/June 1937): 84, 8.1 (July 1937): Sichuan jingji 30.
57 `Cotton-Yarn Trade of Szechwan', Chinese Economic Bulletin 26.1 (5 Jan. 1935):
1±8.
58 Akamatsu Sukeyuki, Shina kakusho Ã keizai jijo Ã (Economic situation of China's
provinces) 3 vols (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai kyo Ãkai, 1935), vol. 2,p .242.
59 Yang Shouchuan, `Jindai Yunnan shangpin jingji shulun' (The commodity eco-
nomy in modern Yunnan), Jingji wenti tansuo (Economic problems) 1989.3 (March
1989): 63.
60 Xie Fang, `Jindai Sichuan nongcun ``gengzhi jiehe'' de fenli guocheng ji qi
juxian' (The breakdown of the link between agriculture and weaving in rural
Sichuan and its limitations), Jindai shi yanjiu (Studies in modern history) 1990.1SOUTHWEST CHINA AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 711
Important though these major items of trade were, their in¯uence
should not be exaggerated. Overall, external trade, although import-
ant for certain areas, accounted for only a small part of the social
product of these regions. Hu Kwoh-hwa described Sichuan as an `isol-
ated province', with little avenue for disposing of agricultural surplus
or ®lling gaps in production.
61 A very crude comparison between
trade ®gures (imports plus exports) in the late 1920s (in current
prices) and my estimate for average provincial output for Sichuan
and Yun-Gui in the 1930s (in 1933 prices) suggests that under 6%
of total product in the two regions passed through the Maritime
Customs. If, however, one were to include the illegal opium trade in
the calculation, and to assume that about one-third of output was
exported from the provinces, the ®gures would be just under 10%
for Sichuan and just over that ®gure for Yun-Gui. In contrast, for
the country as a whole the proportion would be something closer to
12 or even 17%.
62
On a trade-by-trade basis, output of all the major legal commodit-
ies discussed above amounted to only between 3 and 5% of regional
product. While that excludes the earnings of commerce in those
products and does not take into account multiplier effects, on the
other hand a substantial proportion of those commodities was con-
sumed within the region. Even the silk industry, Sichuan's major
source of legal exports before 1929, accounted for under 2% of total
product. Tong oil, dominant in the 1930s was an even smaller part
of the provincial economy. Indeed by these ®gures, it was only
through opium that external trade penetrated to the core of the
economy.
Price Integration
Were there other avenues by which the economies were integrated
into the broader Chinese economy? The Hankou Commercial Monthly
(Jan. 1990): 103±4; Liu Changren, `Chongqing kaibu zhi kangzhan qian Sichuan
meanfangzhiye shengshuai gaikuang (1891±1936)' (The rise and fall of the Sichuan
cotton textile industry between the opening of Chongqing as a port and the Anti-
Japanese War, 1891±1936), Sichuan wenshi ziliao xuanji 40 (1992), pp. 144±8.
61 Hu Kwoh-hwa, `Price Behavior of Rice in Szechwan', Economic Facts 15 (April
1941): 140.
62 Robert F. Dernberger, `The Role of the Foreigner in China's Economic Devel-
opment, 1840±1949', in Dwight H. Perkins (ed.), China's Modern Economy in Historical
Perspective (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), p. 27; Chi-ming Hou, ForeignTIM WRIGHT 712
certainly believed that the Upper Yangzi was integrated into the
Chinese economy through that centre:
Hankou is the centre of gravity of the interior market. The condition of the
farm economy in the various provinces of the Upper Yangzi can be glimpsed
through the Hankou foreign trade ®gures. In recent years under the grow-
ing effects of the world depression, capitalist-dominated China is already
struggling desperately.63
Loren Brandt has argued that prices in a wide variety of centres in
central and eastern China essentially ¯uctuated with those in Shang-
hai,
64 but Chinese scholars in Sichuan and Yunnan differed as to
how far prices in their area re¯ected those in the rest of China.
Prices in Sichuan probably did broadly re¯ect national trends, at
least from the 1920s. A study by Wang Lien indicates a high level
of correlation between movements in the price of rice in Sichuan
and in Wujin, Jiangsu, between 1910 and 1935; the author points
out that the correlation would be even higher if Sichuan prices could
be calculated in Shanghai currency.
65 Figure 1 also shows that from
the mid 1910s rice prices exhibited very similar movements as
between Sichuan and Shanghai. It suggests that perhaps Sichuan
became increasingly integrated into the national economy from the
mid 1910s, with price movements before that period tending to move
in opposite directions in Changning (Sichuan) and Shanghai. This
could be explained by the increasing use of steam navigation up the
Yangzi,
66 and by the increasing sophistication of trading mechan-
isms.
67 On the other hand, it throws doubt on the degree to which
warlord depradations and such factors interrupted commerce.
Concrete examples of arbitrage also suggest a degree of integra-
tion between the Upper Yangzi market and central and eastern
China. Although there was a substantial trade in rice within the
province,
68 the interregional trade was much smaller than in the
Investment and Economic Development in China, 1840±1937 (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1965), p. 189.
63 Hankou shangye yuekan (Hankou commercial monthly) 1.1 (Jan. 1934): 35.
64 Brandt, Commercialization and Agricultural Development, pp. 25±37; Loren Brandt,
`Chinese Agriculture and the International Economy, 1870±1930s: A Reassess-
ment', Explorations in Economic History 22.2 (April 1985): 179.
65 Wang Lien, `Farm Prices in Szechwan, 1910±1934', Economic Facts 9 (April
1938): 412±19; I have not yet found the original data for this study.
66 China, Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1922±1931 (Shanghai: Inspector-
ate General of Customs, 1933), vol. 1,p .473.
67 See Erlanson, `Domestic banks', passim.
68 Akamatsu, Shina kakusho Ã keizai jijo Ã, pp. vol. 2, 179±80.SOUTHWEST CHINA AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 713
Fig. 1. Shanghai and Sichuan Rice Prices, 1903±1930 (Index, 1924±1926=100)
Sources: Shanghai: Brandt, `Chinese Agriculture and the International Economy',
pp. 191±2, using reports in Shenbao.
Changning: Li Zhuxi et al., Jindai Sichuan wujia shiliao (Materials on prices in modern
Sichuan) (Chengdu: Sichuan kexue jishu chuban she, 1987), pp. 75±81.
Chongqing: Li Zhenghong, Sichuan nongye jinrong yu diquan yidong zhi guanxi
(Agricultural ®nance in Sichuan and its link to changes in land ownership) (1938)
vol. 89 in Minguo ershi niandai Zhongguo dalu tudi wenti ziliao (Materials on land prob-
lems in China during the 1930s) (Taibei: Chengwen chuban she, 1977), p. 47086;
see also Xu Daofu, Zhongguo jindai nongye shengchan ji maoyi tongji ziliao (Statistical
materials on agricultural production and trade in modern China) (Shanghai:
Renmin chuban she, 1983), p. 95.
Sichuan: read off ®gure 2 in Wang, `Farm Prices in Szechwan 1910±1934', p. 416.
eighteenth century, when around 2 million piculs were shipped down
the Yangzi.
69 By the twentieth century, the Sichuan Monthly
bemoaned the fact that the province had in face become a net
importer of rice from Hunan.
70 Nevertheless, traders still took
advantage of price differentials in both directions: when rice prices
rose to a very high level in Chongqing, local authorities and mer-
chants imported rice from Hubei and Hunan.
71 In the opposite direc-
tion as well, rice merchants remained conscious of pricesÐand pos-
sible pro®tsÐin eastern China.
72 These mechanisms acted to
69 Han-sheng Chuan and Richard A. Kraus, Mid-Ch'ing Rice Markets and Trade:
An Essay in Price History (Cambridge, Mass: East Asian Research Centre, Harvard
University, 1975), p. 70.
70 SYB 4.5 (May 1934): 12.
71 SYB 4.2 (Feb. 1934): 75, 9.1 (July 1936): 131; J. Lossing Buck and Hu Kwoh-
hwa, `The Price of Rice and Its Determining Factors in Szechwan', Economic Facts
15 (April 1941): 117.
72 SJYK 3.1 (Jan. 1935): 192.TIM WRIGHT 714
Fig. 2. Rice Prices in Shanghai, Guangzhou and Anshun, Guizhou, 1934±1936
(Index, 1934=100)
Sources: Zhongguo shehui kexue yuan Shanghai jingji yanjiu suo and Shanghai
shehui kexue yuan jingji yanjiu suo (eds), Shanghai jiefang qianhou wujia ziliao huibian
(1921 nian±1957 nian) (Materials on Shanghai prices, 1921±1957) (Shanghai
Renmin chuban she, 1958), pp. 186±7, 216±7; Zhang Xiaomei, Guizhou jingji (The
economy of Guizhou) (Shanghai: Zhongguo guomin jingji yanjiu suo, 1939), K38.
integrate prices in Sichuan with those in central China and thence
Shanghai and the world.
Yun-Gui seems much less certain. Obviously the price of the main
export commodity, tin, nearly the whole production of which was
sold outside the province, was determined entirely by the world
market.
73 But data is so lacking on other commodities that it is dif®-
cult to say anything with any con®dence. One series of prices for
Anshun county in Guizhou in the 1930s suggests that prices there
may have re¯ected Guangzhou prices in 1934 and 1935, but were
closer to Shanghai in 1936 (see Figure 2).
Southwest China in the Great Depression
Putting together quantitative and qualitative evidence, the overall
impression is that the Great Depression caused a sharp decline
in some of the major export lines outlined above (most notably
silk), which caused widespread distress. Moreover a general weak-
ness of demand affected a much wider variety of industries and
trades. As in the rest of China, this was re¯ected in generally
73 Zhang, Yunnan jingji,J 23.SOUTHWEST CHINA AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 715
weak prices, and thence in a decline in incomes especially for
farm households. Nevertheless this decline did not shake the
foundations of the economy: many lines of production maintained
output and trading levels, and others emerged to take the place
of those which declined.
External forces other than the Depression also acted to reduce
external demand for Southwest products in the 1930s. The Lower
Yangzi ¯oods, which are often cited as a major cause of the economic
downturn in Eastern China, were not so important for the sale of
Sichuan products. But the loss of the Northeastern market to Japan
was an important negative factor for many handicraft industriesÐ
such as linenÐin Sichuan as elsewhere.
74 In addition, as will be sug-
gested in the next section, internal political stability and favourable
climatic conditions remained in the short term more important for
the well-being of most households than was the state of the outside
economy.
This section uses a wide range of scattered and fragmentary mat-
erials to outline the impact of the Depression. No aggregate data
exist for any major region, let alone the relatively remote Southwest,
although there are a few time series for national product during the
1930s.
75 This section therefore pieces together an outline of the
major trends by using indirect measures: the trends in overall trade
for the region; the fate of the major commodities and trades
described in the previous section; information on broad price trends;
fragmentary information on changes in employment; and equally
partial evidence on changes in income levels.
One problem with using disaggregated data is the overly pessim-
istic tone of the contemporary literature. Such a phenomenon is by
74 You Shimin, Sichuan jindai maoyi shiliao (Historical materials on the trade of
modern Sichuan) (Chengdu: Sichuan daxue chuban she, 1990), p. 225; SJYK 3.6
(June 1935): 199. However, the Bank of China (Chongqing Zhongguo yinhang,
Sichuan sheng zhi xiabu,p .197 and Figure 18) points out that the size of the decline
in linen exports through the Maritime Customs is accounted for more by the indus-
try's attempts to by-pass taxes in Chongqing by using the postal system.
75 There have been four attempts to estimate national economic aggregates
1931±36, but in all cases the primary (though not the sole) intention has been to
develop averages to compare with other periods over the longer term: see Yeh,
`China's National Income, 1931±36'; P. S. Ou, National Income of China (Shanghai,
1946); Sueh-Chang Yang, `China's Depression and Subsequent Recovery, 1931±
1936: An Inquiry into the Applicability of the Modern Income Determination
Theory' (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1950); and Liu Ta-chung, China's
National Income, 1931±36: An Exploratory Study (Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution, 1946).TIM WRIGHT 716
no means limited to the economy of Sichuan,
76 but a particularly
clear example was the strongly expressed concern over a `crisis' of
foreign competition in the tong oil industry in the 1930s, which seems
in hindsight to have been considerably overstated.
77 Despite evidence
in this paper that Yunnan was only loosely tied to the external eco-
nomy, the Yunnan Construction Weekly likewise described the impact
of the Depression as very serious, so that Yunnan was `tossed about
in this situation like a boat on the vast and raging sea'.
78 Contempor-
ary sources also painted a picture of widespread rural distress as a
result of the World Depression, though they also pointed to more
fundamental factors such as the shortage of land.
79 Even remoter
areas of Southwest China were, according to qualitative information,
severely hit by the Depression.
80
In aggregate terms, the trade of the Upper Yangzi declined consid-
erably during the Depression: as Figure 3, which traces the course
of the foreign trade of the two macroregions during the Depression,
indicates, Sichuan's exports fell almost exactly by half from the peak
in1930 to the trough in 1934; imports also fell, though that fall is
exaggerated by the omission from 1932 of imports of foreign goods
from other Chinese ports.
81 The Customs report directly linked the
decline to the World Depression:
The depression in foreign markets in general resulted in a lessened demand
for silk, bristles, wool, skins, hides etc; while the depression in the Straits
and Siam in particular affected the demand from Chinese settlers in these
countries for one of the principal export staples of Szechwan, that is,
medicines.82
There are differing opinions on the fate of Yunnan's trade in this
period. A recent Chinese study of Yunnan's foreign trade agues that
76 Tim Wright, `Coping with the World Depression: The Nationalist Govern-
ment's Relations with Chinese Industry and Commerce, 1932±1936', Modern Asian
Studies 25.4 (Oct. 1991): 652.
77 Rowe, `Tung Oil', pp. 372±3.
78 `Yunnan nongcun jingji yu shengmin jingji zhi qubie ji qi jiuji' (The Yunnan
rural economy and relief for the people's economic situation), Yunnan jianshe zhoukan
(Yunnan construction weekly) 14 (Nov. 1935): 2.
79 Liu Shimo, `Sichuan nongcun zhi bingtai' (Problems of rural Sichuan), Sichuan
nongye (Sichuan agriculture) 1.4 (April 1934): 5±6.
80 See the report from Guizhou quoted in Lloyd E. Eastman, The Abortive Revolu-
tion: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927±1937 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 1974), p. 191.
81 Zhang Xiaomei, Sichuan jingji cankao ziliao (Materials on the Sichuan economy)
(Shanghai: Zhongguo guomin jingji yanjiu suo, 1939), U1±2.
82 China, Maritime Customs, The Trade of China, Annual Report (Shanghai: Inspect-
orate General of Customs, annual), 1932,p .13.SOUTHWEST CHINA AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 717
Fig. 3. Foreign Trade of Sichuan and Yunnan During the Depression (million
yuan)
Sources: Sichuan: Zhang, Sichuan jingji,U 1±2; Yunnan: Jing-Dian gonglu zhoulan
choubei hui Yunnan ten hui, Yunnan gaikuang (General survey of Yunnan) (1937), p.
101, Guo Yuan, Yunnan sheng jingji wenti (Yunnan's economic problems) (Chongqing:
Zhengzhong shuju, 1940), pp. 287±8 and Zhongyang yanjiu yuan, Yunnan zhi maoyi,
pp. 71±2.
the whole period between 1921 and 1932 was one of stagnation and
decline, and `especially from 1929 to 1932 under the in¯uence of
the world economic crisis there was a steep decline in both imports
and exports'.
83 A contemporary source likewise argues that, a fall in
Yunnan's exports to other ports in China in 1934 was `due to the
stagnation of demand in the various Chinese ports as a result of the
in¯uence of the World Depression', while exports recovered in 1935
as the world economic situation improved.
84 Other factors were also
at work, and an observer in the 1930s attributed the decline early
in that decade to ®nancial turbulence and the prevalence of ban-
dits.
85 On the other hand, the Customs statistics (see Figure 3)i n
fact suggest that Yunnan's trade stagnated in the early 1930s, but
hardly that it declined steeply.
86
A complicating factor in trade relations was the fact that in prac-
tice both Sichuan and Yunnan had their own currencies, with chang-
83 Chen Xi, `Yunnan duiwai maoyi de lishi gaishu' (An historical account of Yun-
nan's foreign trade), in Yunnan sheng shehui kexue yuan lishi yanjiu suo, (ed),
Yunnan difang minzu shi luncong (Essays on nationalities history in Yunnan)
(Kunming: Renmin chuban she, 1986), p. 441.
84 Zhang, Yunnan jingji,P 2.
85 Lu, Kunming shi zhi, vol. 11,p .350.
86 Other sources do, however, give different ®gures.TIM WRIGHT 718
ing exchange rates with the national currency and thence of course
with other world currencies.
87 This affected trade both through
uncertainty, leading to a speculative orientation,
88 and through
movements in currency values which were adverse to particular kinds
of trade. In particular the year 1934 saw a sharp devaluation in
Sichuan's currency relative to Shanghai's, which disadvantaged
imports and favoured exports, leading to an improvement in the
overall trade balance and to a resurgence of shipping on the upper
Yangzi.
89 On the other hand, of course, lines of business that involved
the sale of imported goods, such as Nanjing silks, went into a sharp
decline.
90 After central government intervention stabilized the
Sichuan dollar more or less at parity with Shanghai, however,
imports from the rest of China became cheaper, and this was blamed
for the success of Shantou sugar in undermining the market of the
local Neijiang producers.
91 More broadly, the general increase in the
value of silverÐboth national and local currenciesÐin 1934±35
depressed the exports of medicinal products.
92
Yunnan's currency situation was even more chaotic, particularly
up to the mid 1930s when it ¯uctuated wildly against the national
currency, though the overall trend was clearly one of decline: from
around 7:1 at the beginning of the 1930s to around 9:1 in 1934±35.
From about the time of the currency reform, however, the provincial
authorities used the revenue from expanding sales of tin to stabilize
the currency at 10 old Yunnan dollars or 2 new Yunnan dollars to
one national dollar.
93 The instability injected uncertainty into
trade,
94 and the Customs report cited the depreciation of the local
paper currency as one of the reasons for the decline in trade in
1932.
95
87 For Sichuan see Zhang, Sichuan jingji,E 22±4 and SJYK 1.4 (April 1934); zhuan-
lun 5±10.
88 For medicines see Chongqing Zhongguo yinhang, Sichuan sheng zhi yaocai (`The
Medicinal Produce in Szechuen Province') (Chongqing: Zhongguo yinhang zong
guanli chu jingji yanjiu shi, 1934), pp. 163±4.
89 China, The Maritime Customs, Trade of China, 1934,p .17; SJYK 3.1 (Jan.
1935): zhuanlun 74; SYB 7.5 (Nov. 1935): 159.
90 SJYK 3.2 (Feb. 1935): shengnei jingji 93.
91 SYB 9.2 (Aug. 1936): 231.
92 SYB 6.3 (March 1935): 87.
93 Zhang, Yunnan jingji,J 18,T 14.
94 For the 1920s see, China, Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1922±31, vol.
2,p .345.
95 China, Maritime Customs, Trade of China, 1932, vol. 1,p .36.SOUTHWEST CHINA AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 719
Fig. 4. Major Export Commodities During the Depression (Export values in Ch$
million)
Souces: tin: Zhang Yunnan jingji,J 19; silk and tong oil: Gan, Sichuan sheng jinchukou
maoyi tongji, Tables 6, 7; Xu, Zhongguo jindai nongye shengchan ji maoyi tongji ziliao,p .
285; Hu, Sichuan dili,p .48; China, Maritime Customs, Trade of China, 1937.
The Fate of the Major Traded Commodities
Among speci®c trades (see Table 3 for the major commodities in
Sichuan), the silk trade was the most seriously affected in the
Southwest as in the country as a whole. The essential pattern was
that demand in the United States and in the world market fell
sharply soon after the onset of the Depression; this both sharply
forced down the price of Chinese reeled silk (though local prices
were protected to some extent by the devaluation of silver) and
reduced the volume of sales through the main export ports
(Chongqing in the case of Sichuan) even at the lower prices. This
fall in exports naturally led to falling prices for cocoons and reeled
silk in the major producing areas and declining shipments out of
them. This in turn led to falling production and sharply lower
incomes for the producers.
The value of silk exports from Sichuan declined sharply and cata-
strophically from just under Ch$20 million in 1930 to less than one-
tenth that level in 1935±37, while volume fell from 13,500 piculs in
1930 to somewhat under 2000 in 1935 (see Figure 4, which covers
exports of the three major Southwest commoditiesÐsilk, tong oil and
tin). While exports to Shanghai and thence the overseas markets
were hardest hit, other trade routes also declined. Exports throughTIM WRIGHT 720
Yunnan to Thailand fell by some 40%, though those to Burma
remained stronger than those through Shanghai.
96 Overall, silk fell
from around 25% of total provincial exports in the late 1920s to only
between 2 and 3% in the mid-1930s.
97
Weakness of external markets was transmitted to the main produ-
cing areas, ®rst of all through the price mechanism. The history of
silk prices in this period is not totally clear. The aggregate trade
®gures for Sichuan and for China, as well as the Shanghai local price
series, all show that prices declined moderately until 1932, but
steeply thereafter;
98 this was no doubt because the devaluation of
silver acted as a buffer (and in fact most prices in China rose sub-
stantially around 1930). On the other hand, more fragmentary local
®gures show an earlier and steeper decline: the price of factory
reeled silk in Sichuan fell from Ch$1000 per picul in 1929 to only
around Ch$600 in 1932.
99 Prices for Nanchong silk fell from around
Ch$1500 to Ch$500 over the same period, while those of Santai silk
fell less drastically from around Ch$900±1000 per box to Ch$550.
100
Jiading, which relied more on the overland market to India and
Southeast Asia, was less hard hit, but even there cocoon prices fell,
and only low prices for mulberry leaves saved many households from
bankruptcy.
101
Declining markets meant declining production, and output of
cocoons in 1933 was 40% down on the level of the 1920s, according to
Sichuan's local authorities.
102 The decline continued with the output
of reeled silk falling from 30,000 piculs to only around 8000 piculs in
themid1930s.
103Onalocallevel,inthelate1920sinNanchong,there
had been more than 30 workshops producing 1300±1400 piculs of
reeled silk per year; the number of shops and output declined sharply
in the early 1930s with the decline of sales in Shanghai.
104 Further to
thesouth, production ofreeled silk in Jiading fellfromaround5±6000
96 `Sericulture in Szechwan', p. 545; SJYK 7.4 (April 1937): 26.
97 Zhong Chongmin and Zhu Shouren (eds), Sichuan cansi chanxiao diaocha baogao
(Report of an investigation into the production and sale of Sichuan silk)
(Chongqing: Zhongguo nongmin yinhang jingji yanjiu chu, 1944), p. 8.
98 Shanghai jingji yanjiu suo, Shanghai jiefang qianhou wujia, pp. 239±41; Gan,
Sichuan sheng jinchukou maoyi tongji, p. 76.
99 `Sericulture in Szechwan', p. 545.
100 SYB 1.3 (Sept. 1932): 27, 1.4 (Oct. 1932): 41, 6.1 (June 1935): 71±2.
101 SJYK 3.6 (June 1935): 183.
102 `Sericulture in Szechwan', pp. 539±41.
103 Hu, Sichuan dili,p .38.
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piculs in the 1920st o2±3000 in the 1930s.
105 Modern ®latures also
suffered:inChongqing,theDahuaSilkCompanywasformedasacon-
glomerate of eleven ®latures to try to overcome the effects of the
Depression, but was unsuccessful in doing so.
106 Several new ®latures
were, however, established in the early 1930s.
107
Falling production and prices meant falling incomes, disruption
and poverty in the silk producing areas of Sichuan. In Nanchong and
Xichong farmers relied on silk to earn money to buy grain from
neighbouring areas; the collapse of demand forced losses on many
households, deepened the bankruptcy of the rural economy and
greatly increased unemployment.
108 The decline ¯owed through to
minor centres such as Hechuan to the north of Chongqing where
the loss of export markets bankrupted silk reelers and agricultural
households chopped down their mulberry trees for ®rewood.
109
Nevertheless, such a picture has to be quali®ed in two major ways.
First, despite the falls in income and the suffering caused, the eco-
nomic structure outlined in Table 1 showed that less than 1.5%o f
provincial product was contributed by the silk industry. While the
qualitative evidence of crisis, in the form of the continual return by
local periodicals to the problems of the industry, suggests a greater
importance, the estimate would have to be very far out indeed to
validate any claim that the decline of the industry shook the founda-
tions of the economy.
Second, the decline of silk production was at least partly balanced
by a shift to other lines of production, what we know as economic
restructuring. In Longchang (which was not one of the most import-
ant producing districts), farmers who had depended on silk reacted
to the decline in world prices by ripping up their mulberry trees and
planting grain; in the slack season they switched from the silk indus-
try to weaving linen cloth, though the increased numbers of weaving
households forced down the price of cloth.
110 There was a similar
story in Bishan to the west of Chongqing.
111
105 SJYK 7.4 (April 1937): 26.
106 Sichuan nongye 1.2 (Feb. 1934): 49; Qiyeshi ziliao yanjiu zhongxin, Shanghai
shehui kexue yuan jingji yanjiu suo: `Report of the National Bureau of Economic
Research: The Raw Silk Industry of Sichuan', p. 5. I would like to thank Professor
Huang Hanmin for his help in giving me access to these archives.
107 Zhang Xuejun and Zhang Lihong, Sichuan jindai gongye shi (History of modern
industry in Sichuan) (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chuban she, 1990), pp. 215±17.
108 SJYK 3.4/5 (April/May 1935): 147, 3.6 (June 1935): 181.
109 SJYK 3.6 (June 1935): 179.
110 SJYK 4.1 (July 1935): 147.
111 SYB 6.5 (May 1935).TIM WRIGHT 722
In contrast to silk, tin exports from Yun-Gui on the whole did
relatively well through the 1930s, both in quantity and in price.
Quantity was stimulated by the modernization of operations by the
provincial government, reaching almost to a record level in 1933.
112
Exports in 1934 fell by 30%, but this was because of problems with
supply due to bad weather and an epidemic among the workers,
113
not a fall in demand, and they still remained at a level higher than
the late 1920s (though not the early 1920s). World tin prices fell
sharply in the early 1930s,
114 but the devaluation of the Chinese
currency meant local prices fell much more moderately, reaching a
trough in 1934, but at a level only some 7% below the late 1920s;
after 1934 prices recovered very rapidly to record levels from
1936.
115
Other export lines maintained volumes (less often values)
throughout the 1930s, while still others actually grew, to some
extent taking up the slack left by silk and other products in decline.
Many articles in the Chinese economic press bemoaned the `crisis'
in the tong oil trade,
116 and prices fell sharply up to 1933 as a result of
declining demand from American industry during the Depression.
117
Because tong oil was produced on the whole in the less highly com-
mercialized areas of Sichuan, there is less information on any disrup-
tion caused, but it is likely to have been substantially less than in
the case of silk. In any case, quantities traded remained large and
relatively strong throughout the period and Sichuan sources make
clear that it was the source of continuing prosperity.
118 In Nanchong,
the economic centre of the north of the province, it replaced silk as
the mainstay of trade.
119
Despite complaints about the dumping of foreign sugar, sugar pro-
duction and exports in Neijiang were growing up to 1933, before the
drought reversed the trend. Prices, too, do not seem to have been
affected by any dumping, though the Sichuan Economy Monthly
112 China, Maritime Customs, Trade of China, 1933,p .31.
113 China, Maritime Customs, Trade of China, 1934,p .38.
114 William Robertson, Tin: Its Production and Marketing (London: Croom Helm,
1982), p. 134.
115 Zhang, Yunnan jingji,J 19,J 24±5.
116 See Rowe, `Tung oil', pp. 371±2.
117 SJYK 3.3 (March 1935): 59.
118 See e.g. SYB 9.3 (Sept. 1936): 217.
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reported declining incomes and employment in the early 1930s.
120
Tobacco exports declined, though contemporaries, citing the growth
in imports of cigarettes, attributed this more to quality problems
than to the Depression.
121 Linen prices and output fell in the early
1930s, though the Bank of China blamed high taxesÐboth within
Sichuan and by the Japanese in KoreaÐand bad organization rather
than the Depression. By 1934, both measures were again improving,
and the Bank even allowed itself a degree of optimism.
122
Opium again is dif®cult to analyse along conventional lines. To
some extent, the trade responded to economic determinants but
even more than with other products, political and social factors also
remained important. There is some evidence that there was a fall in
demand for opium: the Central China Daily News reported that `in
recent years opium smokers in Kweichow [Guizhou] have decreased
considerably as a result of economic depression and the poor people
cannot afford to take opium'.
123 Although one might have expected
demand for such a luxury product to drop in a period of economic
decline, in the West depressions generally see sales of alcohol hold-
ing up well; a survey of trade in Wanxian said that leisure industries
were an exception to the general picture of decline,
124 and a mid-
1930s estimate said that Chengdu consumed annually Ch$3.5 mil-
lion-worth of tobacco, Ch$3 million of opium, Ch$1.2 million of cos-
metics and Ch$0.5 million of wine.
125 It may have been that opium
detracted from the pain of economic decline.
Other sources attributed any decline in demand to high taxes,
the New Life Movement, or campaigns to ban opium.
126 The opium
suppression in Yunnan led to trade de®cits in 1934 and 1935, after
many years of surplus; increases in other exports, however, brought
trade back into surplus from 1936. It also led to an increase in cigar-
ette imports into the province.
127
120 Fang Binsheng, `Sichuan zhetang diaocha baogao' (Report on the sugar indus-
try in Sichuan), in Xinan jingji diaocha hezuo weiyuanhui, Sichuan jingji kaochatuan,
pp. 257, 262±3; SJYK 3.6 (June 1935): 201.
121 Hu, Sichuan dili,p .29.
122 Chongqing Zhongguo yinhang, Sichuan sheng zhi xiabu, pp. 214±17.
123 FO371,F 6095/87/87, translation from Central China Daily News, 23 Aug.
1934.
124 SJYK 2.5 (Nov. 1934): 2.
125 SJYK 7.4 (April 1937): 18.
126 SJYK 3.1 (Jan. 1935): 192.
127 Zhang, Yunnan jingji,P 1.TIM WRIGHT 724
Opium prices ¯uctuated in response to the Depression and a vari-
ety of other forces. Prices for the best Yunnan opium fell from about
Ch$7±800/picul around 1930 to only around Ch$300 in 1934,
128 and
American consular of®cials reported an even steeper decline in prices
expressed in local Yunnan currency.
129 Whether this was because of
lower demand or generally good harvests, in some areas the farmers
were barely able to recoup the costs of production. On the other
hand, lower prices increased the attractiveness of smoking opium as
against tobacco, so may have increased total demand.
130
Nevertheless, lower opium prices, and possibly lower output
because of prohibition, did adversely affect both rural and urban
incomes. British reports spoke of the dif®culties cultivators faced
when merchants, seeing a decline in demand, whether for economic
or for political reasons, refused to buy the crop. The Yunnan Construc-
tion Weekly described the government ban on opium in the 1930sa s
a blow to rural incomes,
131 and American diplomats and the Chinese
economist Zhang Xiaomei identi®ed a decline of opium cultivation
as the cause of falling farm purchasing power and business depres-
sion, and hence falling demand for foreign imports.
132
Other Price and Income Effects
In the eastern part of China, the Depression had a much greater
impact on prices and incomes than on output. Sharp falls in the
prices of most goods, with agricultural products falling the most,
caused a sharp deterioration in the terms of trade of farmers, and
led to a serious decline in farm incomes, especially in the more com-
mercialized areas.
133
There is evidence for some fall in prices in the Upper Yangzi
region, though not as severe as in the east. In addition to the fall in
128 FO371,F 6095/87/87, translation from Central China Daily News, 23 Aug.
1934.
129 US 893.114, Narcotics/ 858: American Consulate, Yunnanfu, to Secretary of
State, 8 September 1934.
130 FO371,F 4317/87/87, Harding to Cadogan, 6 June 1934.
131 FO371,F 5112/116/87, Harding to Cadogan, 13 June 1935; `Yunnan nongcun
jingji', p. 4.
132 US 893.114, Narcotics/ 858: American Consulate, Yunnanfu, to Secretary of
State, 8 September 1934; Zhang, Yunnan jingji,P 2.
133 Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth in Prewar China (Berkeley: University of
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Fig. 5. Rice Prices in Shanghai and Chongqing During the Depression (Index,
1929±31=100)
Sources: Shanghai: Shanghai jingji yanjiu suo, Shanghai jiefang qianhou wujia,p .213;
Chongqing: Li, Sichuan nongye jinrong,p .47086.
the prices of export commodities outlined above, Figure 5 plots
Sichuan against Shanghai rice prices. Rice prices in Sichuan fell
sharply between 1931 and 1933, though the magnitude of the fall
re¯ects an abnormally high 1931 price.
134 The Sichuan Economic
Monthly saw the fall in grain prices as one of the major factors leading
to the immiseration of the farm population, with income losses due
to price falls and ¯uctuations in production amounting to Ch$106
million in 1932 and Ch$177 million in 1933.
135 Whatever the precise
picture was, there is no evidence that rice farmers in Southwest
China were as devastated by the impact of depression as were their
fellows over the border in Vietnam.
136 Sharply higher rice prices in
1936 (at least as much the result of drought as of any recovery from
the Depression) induced workers to return to agriculture in place of,
for example, the linen weaving industry to which they had earlier
been attracted.
137
Falls in price reduced pro®ts and hence employment in a wide
variety of trades and urban handicrafts in the Southwest. The
Sichuan Economic Monthly reported that urban commerce in Chong-
134 SJYK 3.4/5 (April/May 1935): 166±7.
135 SJYK 3.4/5 (April/May 1935): 169.
136 Pierre Brocheux, The Mekong Delta: Ecology, Economy and Revolution, 1860±1960
(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin-Madison, Center for South-east Asian Stud-
ies, 1995), pp. 153±4.
137 SYB 8.5 (May 1936): 129.TIM WRIGHT 726
qing and Wanxian was in dif®culty and all lines of business in
Chengdu in 1933 in a state of depression as a result ®rstly of the
world economic crisis, but also of wars, bandit activities and taxes.
138
Many ®rms throughout the province were forced to close: one report
claimed that in Hechuan 62 ®rms, the largest of which were in silk
cloth, salt and grain but with others covering the whole span of local
economic activity, went bankrupt because of the economic and rural
depression.
139
Even in Yunnan, where there is less evidence of any general fall
in prices, some industries experienced declining pro®ts and employ-
ment as a result of falling prices. Some handicraft products, such as
Yuxi cotton cloth, lost their markets in 1934±35,
140 and local match
factory managers complained about `unbearable' losses because of
excessive competition.
141 As a result, in 1934 local factories joined
the national trend to set up a cooperative sales plan.
142
On the other hand, as shown above in the case of silk, focusing
entirely on industries in decline leads to exaggeration of the net
effect, as some industries grew as the economy restructured. In
Sichuan, the growth of the leather goods industry provided many
jobs in a generally depressed Chengdu labour market,
143 and the
dried vegetable trade expanded rapidly in Chongqing in 1934±35.
144
In shipping, many small and poorly capitalized ®rms were forced out
of business by ®erce competition in a declining market, but this has
to be balanced against the success of the growing Minsheng com-
pany, the employment that it provided and the savings it generated
for customers through more ef®cient transport.
145 Minsheng cer-
tainly posted rapidly growing pro®ts throughout the 1930s.
146
Similarly in Yunnan, employment and incomes (though perhaps
at declining real wages
147) in at least some urban industries
138 SJYK 1.5 (May 1934): diaocha 7, 2.5 (Nov. 1934): diaocha 1, 3.1 (Jan. 1935):
191.
139 SYB 8.4 (April 1936): 92.
140 Lu, Kunming shi zhi changbian, vol. 12,p .287.
141 Second Historical Archives, 422(3)/127, Kunming factory reports; see also Lu,
Kunming shi zhi changbian, vol. 11,p .45.
142 Lu, Kunming shi zhi changbian, vol. 12,p .277.
143 SYB 8.3 (March 1936): 103.
144 SYB 8.4 (April 1936): 79.
145 SYB 6.5 (May 1935): 140.
146 Xin shijie 10.5/6 (1 April 1937): 80.
147 Food prices for the working class seem to have risen throughout the 1930s,
at least in terms of the local currency, see Lu, Kunming shi zhi changbian, vol. 11, pp.
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increased as a result of the ®rst steps towards industrialization in
the 1930s. A reminiscence of Kunming spoke, albeit disparagingly
as evidence of rural decline, of the rapid growth of the industrial
labour force between 1934 and 1937.
148 New industries, such as soap,
emerged in a local import-substituting industrialization drive,
149 and
the local warlord government had plans for industrial development,
for example establishing a cotton spinning enterprise from 1934,
which began operations in 1937.
150
Contemporary observers cited a fall in rural incomes as the cause
of a decline in yarn imports into Sichuan,
151 and falling match sales
as people were saving on items of daily consumption in a situation
of general economic collapse.
152 The next section will deal with other
major in¯uences on the level of rural incomes, but there were three
ways in which the Depression might have reduced them. First the
decline of the export trades and handicraft industries reduced
incomes and employment. The Sichuan Economic Monthly argued that
in just one county, Rong xian, the number of unemployed rural resid-
ents increased by over 120,000 between the 1920s and 1930s.
153
Second, in most areas of the world, the terms of trade turned
against rural producers during the Depression. Studies of prices in
Sichuan suggest that farmers' terms of trade declined somewhat
between 1931 and 1934, but then recovered; nor was the decline in
those years any sharper than ¯uctuations in the 1910so r1920s.
154
However, in Yunnan, farmers' terms of trade actually improved
during the 1930s because of natural disasters throughout the
province.
155
Finally, in some areas of the world, de¯ation reduced farm incomes
through higher real rates of taxation when taxes levied were in
cash.
156 Such a mechanism had certainly operated in China in earlier
148 Lu, Kunming shi zhi changbian, vol. 11,p .43.
149 Lu, Kunming shi zhi changbian, vol. 12,p .280.
150 Ibid., p. 164; China, The Maritime Customs, The Trade of China, 1937, vol. 1,
p. 48.
151 `Cotton-Yarn Trade of Szechwan', p. 1; see also Sichuan nongye 1.4 (April
1934): 34.
152 Second Historical Archives, 422(3)/127, Kunming factory reports.
153 SJYK 3.6 (June 1935): 200.
154 Hu, `Price Behavior of Rice', p. 140; Buck and Hu, `The Price of Rice', p. 119.
155 Lu, Kunming shi zhi changpian, vol. 12,p .206.
156 Dietmar Rothermund, The Global Impact of the Great Depression, 1929±1939
(London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 16±17, 76; Neil Charlesworth, `The Peasant and
the Depression: The Case of the Bombay Presidency, India', in Brown (ed.), The
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periods, as for instance in the early nineteenth-century de¯ation.
157
There was a great deal of controversy over tax rates in Sichuan in
the 1930s, but mainly over the collection of the land tax many years
or even decades in advance.
158 I have not, however, found any refer-
ences to problems resulting from de¯ation.
On balance, it is likely that the Depression led to somewhat lower
rural incomes, but there is little evidence of the sort of disastrous
decline that took place in Vietnam or India.
159
Other In¯uences on the Regional Economy
In general other in¯uencesÐparticularly political stability, and the
weatherÐaffected the regional economy more than did the Depres-
sion. Unlike the Depression, they penetrated to the heart of the
agricultural economy, and in¯uenced the production and distribution
of the key food crops which constituted the bulk of total output.
Perhaps most importantly, the level of political and military disrup-
tion was a crucial determinant of economic health in both macrore-
gions. Most observers saw the continuous wars between different fac-
tions in Sichuan right up to 1934 as the major barrier to the
province's development, both through interruption to normal com-
merce and through excessive taxation reducing purchasing power
and bankrupting merchants.
160
As successive Customs Reports pointed out, the internecine wars
between the garrison areas seriously disrupted trade and commerce
in Sichuan.
161 In the course of the Two Lius War of 1932±34 the
medicine trade became depressed because of the dif®culty of ship-
ping the produce down river to the lower Yangzi area.
162 Overland
trade routes to Shaanxi in the northwest and Yunnan and Guizhou
to the south were even more vulnerable, and the lucrative linen trade
suffered grievously in the course of the ®ghting in 1934±35.
163
157 Kathryn Bernhardt, Rents, Taxes, and Peasant Resistance: The Lower Yangzi region,
1840±1950 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 48±9.
158 Jerome Chen, The Military±Gentry Coalition: China Under the Warlords (Toronto:
University of Toronto±York University Joint Centre on Modern East Asia, 1979),
pp. 134, 141.
159 Brocheux, Mekong Delta, pp. 153±4; Dietmar Rothermund, India in the Great
Depression, 1929±1939 (New Delhi: Manohar, 1992), ch. 4.
160 Zhang and Zhang, Sichuan jindai gongye shi, pp. 298±301.
161 See for example China, Maritime Customs, Trade of China, 1933, vol. 1,p .10.
162 SYB 5.5 (Nov. 1934): 101.
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Another source of instability was the passage of the Communist
armies through the region in the course of the Long March. Thus
Sichuan Agriculture reported a panic in rice prices in 1934 because
the Red Armies were taking all the rice in certain counties.
164 On
the other hand, the same reason was cited both for a sharp fall in
the price of sugar and for a rise in the price of silk.
165 After the
`suppression' (or rather departure) of the `bandits', trade revived,
with medicinal herbs being a particular bene®ciary.
166 Similarly both
the depradations of the Communists and the interruption to trans-
port were major impediments to the trade of Yunnan in April±May
1935, although overall trends were upward.
167 Industrial enterprises
in both Guizhou and Yunnan complained about the effects of the
®ghting on their sales, with one mill in Guizhou forced to close.
168
Finally, local bandits preyed on the rural economy, blocking trade
and reducing farmers' purchasing power. In 1934 the transfer of
most of the regular army to ward off the Communist threat created
a vacuum into which emerged increased numbers of local bandits.
For example, in Xiyang, an estimated 3000 bandits, armed with
more than a thousand guns, struck terror into villages, so that the
old died, the able-bodied absconded while the villages fell deserted.
169
But in turn banditry itself was caused by rural bankruptcy.
170 Bandits
also blocked trade routes, especially the over-land ones to the
Northwest: in mid 1937 trade routes between Sichuan and Gansu
were being reopened with the passing of the major bandit threatÐ
small-scale bandits were said to be unable to interrupt the large
trade caravans.
171
High and excessive taxes, partly to fund this military activity, were
perhaps the problem most commonly focused on by contemporary
observers. Villages in Xingwen county became impoverished in 1934
partly because of an increase in the militia tax from Ch$10 to
Ch$18.
172 In Neijiang, repeated wars over control of the Tuo river
164 Sichuan nongye 1.1 (Jan. 1934): 41.
165 SJYK 4.4 (Oct. 1935): 3, 5.4 (April 1936): 22.
166 SYB 9.5 (Nov. 1936): 100.
167 To Ãkyo Ã sho Ãko Ã kaigisho, Shina keizai nempo Ã (Annual economic report for China,
1936) (Tokyo: Kaizo Ãsha, 1936), p. 618.
168 Second Historical Archives 422(3)/127, report by Xingminsan Match Factory
in Kunming; 422(3)/110, report of Fuguo Weaving Mill, Chishui xian Guizhou.
169 SJYK 3.6 (June 1935): 202.
170 Cai Shaoqing, Minguo shiqi de tufei (Bandits in the Republican period) (Beijing:
Zhongguo renmin daxue chuban she, 1993), p. 226.
171 SJYK 8.1 (July 1937): 30±1.
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and the heavy taxes levied to pay for those wars forced 5% of peas-
ants under each year and led to a long-term decline of the sugar
industry to a level in the 1930s only half that of the early 1910s.
173
As Kapp points out,
174 in addition to taxes for the main provincial
armies were levies to support local militias, whose function was often
protection against the armies: thus in the context of province-wide
wars in 1933±34 taxes to support the militia in the silk-producing
centre of Santai trebled from Ch$50,000 to Ch$150,000.
175
Commerce was undoubtedly faced with a multitude of local taxes,
and contemporary sources often attributed the decline of a line of
trade to high taxes, as for example was the case with the trade in
Chinese medicines through Chongqing.
176 Similarly silk was taxed
both at the Cuqiao market near Chengdu and then again when it
was shipped elsewhere; the taxes joined with wars, agricultural bank-
ruptcy and contracting markets as explanations for the industry's
decline.
177 The salt industry, the largest industrial employer in
Sichuan, was also vulnerable. It was little affected by the Depression:
production in the 1930s ¯uctuated between some seven and seven
and a half million dan, slightly down from the eight million of the
late 1920s.
178 Contemporary sources did, however, talk about a crisis
caused by high taxes, which undermined the competitiveness of
Sichuan salt in its major markets.
179
Despite a large amount of qualitative and even quantitative evid-
ence on the damage done to the Sichuan economy by the various
manifestations of militarization, it is important not to exaggerate
that impact. Thomas Rawski in particular has argued against excess-
ive emphasis on military disruption as an impediment to economic
growth in China as a whole. He uses both qualitative and quantitat-
ive arguments. First, he argues essentially that it was not in the
173 Neijiang diqu dang'an guan, Minguo shiqi Neijiang shutang dang'an ziliao xuanbian
(Collected archival materials on the sugar industry in Neijiang during the Repub-
lican period) (Neijiang, 1984), pp. 7±8.
174 Robert A. Kapp, Szechwan and the Chinese Republic: Provincial Militarism and Cent-
ral Power, 1911±1938 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 45.
175 Santai xian xianzheng yuekan (Administrative monthly of Santai xian) 1 July
1935,p .86.
176 SYB 4.4 (April 1934): 82.
177 SYB 5.3 (Sept. 1934): 66.
178 Ding Changqing et al., Minguo yanwu shi gao (History of the salt industry under
the Republic) (Beijing: Renmin chuban she, 1990), p. 148.
179 Zhongguo gongcheng shi xuehui, Zhongguo gongcheng shi xuehui Sichuan koacha
tuan baogao (Report of the Sichuan investigation group) (Zhongguo gongcheng shi
xuehui, 1935), 14:7.SOUTHWEST CHINA AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 731
interests of the warlords to kill the goose that lay the golden egg:
they could not afford to be so punitive in their taxation of commerce
that commerce would cease. Second, he makes rough calculations,
including some for Sichuan, that suggest that government revenue
accounted for under 3% of agricultural output, and for only 2%o f
total provincial product (but Bramall's estimate is over 9% of provin-
cial product
180), and that for the country as a whole spending by all
levels of government accounted for only between 4 and 7.2% of Gross
Domestic Product.
181 He also argues that wars tended to be of low
intensity, with at most a highly localized impact.
182
Moreover, as the Sichuan Economic Monthly admitted, the presence
of an army led to increased expenditure in the local economy as well
as increased taxation. So when, in the wake of the integration of
Sichuan into the national government, armed forces were trans-
ferred from the garrison areas of northern Sichuan to the west of
the province to ®ght the Communists, the economy of the former
area, particularly Nanchong, went into decline.
183 Bramall general-
izes such reports to argue that the rise in military expenditure rep-
resented a major injection into the economy, which balanced declines
in the silk and tong oil industries (thus the rise in military expendit-
ure was greater than the decline in the exports through the
Customs).
184
The converse of disruption in times of war was that, when peace
reigned, the economy was seen as progressing smoothly: the restora-
tion of at least relative peace in Sichuan from 1934 (and its incipient
integration into the national political system) gave the province's
economy a powerful boost, at a time when the rest of the country
was coming to the depth of the Depression. Thus the Customs
reported `the greater political stability and more satisfactory ®nan-
cial conditions [in Chongqing] prevailing throughout the year [1936]
had a favourable effect upon trade in general'.
185 Similarly in Yunnan
the relative stability of the province under Long Yun, whose govern-
ment even made some initial attempts to foster economic develop-
180 Chris Bramall, In Praise of Maoist Economic Planning: Living Standards and Eco-
nomic Development in Sichuan since 1931 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 234.
181 Rawski, Economic Growth in Prewar China, pp. 20, 23.
182 ibid., p. 38.
183 SJYK 6.4 (Oct. 1936): 54.
184 Bramall, In Praise of Maoist Economic Planning, pp. 250±1.
185 China, Maritime Customs, Trade of China, 1936,p .20; also China, Maritime
Customs, Trade of China, 1935,p .17.TIM WRIGHT 732
ment, even more clearly outweighed movements in the world
economy.
186
Because of the predominance of agriculture in the economy of the
Southwest, the weather had a greater effect than ¯uctuations in the
world economy. In normal times, observers saw the weather as the
main determinant of food prices through its effect on supply,
187 and
so were puzzled by the apparent contradiction in the 1930s of falling
production and at the same time falling prices, while theory told
them that prices should have risen in that situation.
188
In many areas of the province, there is no doubt that the most
serious crisis of the early and mid 1930s was caused not by move-
ments in the world economy or even, directly, by warfare, but by the
droughts and ensuing famines that struck Sichuan in 1934 and
1936±37, just as China as a whole was coming out of the Depression
and enjoying a few months of brief prosperity on the eve of the
Japanese invasion. Drought in 1934 affected a range of economic
activities, including tong oil production,
189 and it was drought not
depression that reversed the growth of Neijiang sugar exports from
1934.
190 The 1934 famine, caused by both ¯oods and droughts,
reportedly involved over eighty counties, with 70 to 80% of the popu-
lation of Hechuan, for example, reduced to eating bark.
191
Inadequate rainfall in 1936 and early 1937, as well as by the pas-
sage of the Communist armies of Zhang Guotao, were the main
causes of the disaster of 1936±37. Bramall estimated a 30% decline
in average food consumption in that year, while infant mortality rose
from 250 per 1000 to 400.
192 A secret report for the National Gov-
ernment estimated that 80% of the province was affected, and a
potential 30 million people.
193 The situation was already becoming
serious from mid 1936, with reports talking of widespread cannibal-
186 `Yunnan jindai shi' bianxie zu, Yunnan jindai shi (The modern history of
Yunnan) (Kunming: Renmin chuban she, 1993), p. 430; see also China, Maritime
Customs, Trade of China, 1937,p .47, etc.
187 Hu, `Price behavior of rice', p. 141.
188 SJYK 6.3 (Sept. 1936): 51.
189 SJYK 2.5 (Nov. 1934): diaocha 1.
190 Fang, `Sichuan zhetang', p. 257.
191 Gan Diankui, `Yijiusansi nian he yijiusanliu nian liangnian Sichuan zaiqing
shuyao' (The disasters in Sichuan in 1934 and 1936), Sichuan wenshi ziliao xuanji 3
(1962), pp. 138±42; Kuang Shanji et al., Sichuan junfa shi (History of the Sichuan
warlords) (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chuban she, 1991), p. 429.
192 Bramall, Living Standards, pp. 22±3.
193 Second Historical Archives 422(2)/1072: secret report, Administrative Yuan,
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ism, for instance in the Wan xian area where refugees ¯eeing into
the county were being killed for their ¯esh. In Wanyuan soup made
from human ¯esh was openly sold,
194 and the press reported that the
population of that county had declined by one-third, either through
¯ight or through death.
195
Again, it is not easy to calculate the overall effect of the famine.
Perhaps surprisingly, this event does not feature in either of the two
major recent studies of Sichuan's population history.
196 All in all,
however, there is little doubt that it had a greater impact than did
declining export markets.
Conclusion
In conclusion, therefore, this study advocates a position in between
the extremes outlined in the introduction. The World Depression
certainly did not induce major economic dislocation in the Upper
Yangzi or Yun-Gui macroregions. Only relatively small sectors of
those economies were integrated into the national or international
economies, and of those only some suffered serious disruption. On
the other hand, at least in the Upper Yangzi, there was substantial
restructuring, as the province joined other areas in China and Japan
in having to reduce its income from and its dependence on
sericulture.
Of the two macroregions, it is clear that the Upper Yangzi was
both more closely tied into the national economy than Yun-Gui and
more affected by the Depression. Prices in Sichuan moved very
roughly in concert with those in the Lower Yangzi and Shanghai; but
what very little information is available for Yun-Gui suggests that
prices there did not follow trends in the rest of China. Moreover,
while Sichuan was linked to other areas of China by a whole series
of trades, from silks and linen to medicines and hides, Yunnan had
only one major export, tin, nearly all of which was exported directly
194 Zhenwu xunkan (Relief weekly) 34 (1 July 1936), 35 (21 July 1936).
195 Gan, `Sichuan zaiqing shuyao', p. 145.
196 Liu Hongkang et al., Zhongguo renkou (Sichuan fence) (The population of China:
Sichuan) (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chuban she, 1988), pp. 245±9 gives the
age structure of Sichuan's population in 1982, which shows very clearly the effect
of the 1959±61 famine, but shows no real trace of that in the 1930s; Li Shiping et
al., Jindai Sichuan renkou (The population of modern Sichuan) (Chengdu: Chengdu
chuban she, 1993), p. 96, shows steady population growth throughout the period.TIM WRIGHT 734
abroad. Of course, this conclusion would have to be modi®ed if one
took into account opium, but if anything that seems to have been
the exception that proves the rule with Yun-Gui.
In neither case, however, was the level of integration very high,
and the bulk of the economy (agricultural food crops) mostly oper-
ated according to local forces. Thus the outside world, through the
Depression, affected pockets, but only pockets of the regional eco-
nomies. The effect was greater in the Upper Yangzi, both because
of its higher level of general integration and because of the collapse
of its major export commodity, silk. Yun-Gui escaped more lightly:
its level of integration was lower, and its main export product, tin,
did relatively well in the 1930s.
While the crisis, such as it was, was passing by 1935 and 1936,
with the recovery of some trade lines and the growth of others, the
Upper Yangzi's economy was shaken far more fundamentally by the
drought and famine of 1936±37, before the two macroregions, along
with the rest of the country, were overwhelmed by the Japanese
invasion.SOUTHWEST CHINA AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 735
Appendix I: Derivation of Data in Table 1
Table 1 is not supposed to represent any particular year. Thus, while
most of the output ®gures are, for data reasons, from the early
1930s, that for silk is from the late 1920s, as the aim is to give an
idea of the economic structure of the region before the Depression.
The conception and basic methodology are taken from Chris
Bramall, Living Standards in Sichuan, 1931±1978 (London: Contem-
porary China Institute, School of Oriental and African Studies, Uni-
versity of London, 1989), pp. 75±85.
The sources for the population ®gures are Bramall, Living Stand-
ards,p .60; Pan Zhifu et al., Zhongguo renkou: Guizhou fence (The popula-
tion of China: Guizhou) (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chuban
she, 1988), pp. 66±7, 83; and Zou Qiyu et al., Zhongguo renkou: Yunnan
fence (The population of China: Yunnan) (Beijing: Zhongguo caizh-
eng jingji chuban she, 1989), pp. 84±5, 116; note that in the last
two cases the 1930s estimates have been adjusted upwards to ensure
consistency with the more reliable 1952 ®gures.
I have reworked Bramall's ®gures for Sichuan in 1933 (rather than
1952) prices, which seemed more appropriate for this project. While
for this purpose 1926±28 prices would be ideal, in general 1933 prices
were similar; where that was not the case (in particular for silk),
prices from the late 1920s are used instead. The prices used, how-
ever, are mostly national not local prices, taken from Ta-chung Liu
and Kung-chia Yeh, The Economy of the Chinese Mainland: National
Income and Economic Development 1933±1959 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1965), passim.
I have accepted Bramall's estimates for output in Sichuan except
for two productsÐopium and tobaccoÐand for the share of services.
I have also made adjustments for tong oil, silk and matches.
Opium
As explained in the text, this table uses an estimate of 500,000
piculs for opium production, rather than Bramall's 1.4 million.
Sichuan reports (US 893.114 American Consul, Hankow, to Secret-
ary of State, Con®dential Report, 23 December 1930), Narcotics/
178 suggest that a ®gure of about Ch$800/picul was an approximate
farm-gate price for opium in the early 1930s.TIM WRIGHT 736
Tobacco
Most of the reputable sources support Bramall's ®gure for tobacco
production, which is based on National Agricultural Research Bureau
®gures. Nevertheless I ®nd the ®gure hard to believe. It suggests
that tobacco was by far the most important cash crop except for
opium: Bramall's ®gures suggest it was more than ®ve times as
important than silk. Sichuan was certainly a major tobacco producer
and exported tobacco to Northwest as well as Southwest China. The
bulk of the qualitative sources suggest, however, that silk was the
most important cash crop: that is the case whether one looks at
reports of cultivation or at reports of trade. In neither case do period-
icals such as Sichuan Monthly or Sichuan Economic Monthly, or indeed
the decennial or annual customs reports, make more than passing
reference to tobacco. There appear to have been no cigarette factor-
ies in Sichuan, while there were many small factories making, for
example, matches or soap, never mind silk or cotton textiles (Zhang
and Zhang, Sichuan jindai gongye shi, pp. 213±94). Moreover in a bib-
liography of articles on the Sichuan economy (Sichuan kanwu Sichuan
chanye jingji ziliao suoyin [Index of articles in Sichuan periodicals on
the Sichuan economy] [rep, Chengdu: guji shuju, 1983]), there are
only nine articles on tobacco, of which only six are exclusively on
that topic; this compares with 86 on silk. None of this is conclusive,
but it induces me to choose a substantially lower estimate for output,
which is also based in documentary materials (See Shanghai shangye
chuxu yinhang diaocha bu, Yan yu yanye (Tobacco and the tobacco
trade) (Shanghai: Shanghai shangye chuxu yinhang diaocha bu,
1934), p. 30; broadly consistent ®gures are given in Akamatsu, Shina
kakusho Ã keizai jijo Ã, vol. 2,p .181: 867,10 dan [1934]; Hu, Sichuan dili,
p. 27: 600,000 dan [1936], Mo, Sichuan sheng yancao diaocha,p .7:
866,160 dan [1936]). I would not claim that the provenance of my
estimate is superior to that of Bramall's, however.
Silk
Bramall's estimates for the silk industry did not include reeled silk,
which I have included, but that was a relatively small part of net
value added, and his low estimate for silk, which allows the whole
industry under 1% of provincial product, is more importantly a result
of an output estimate which may already have re¯ected the begin-SOUTHWEST CHINA AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 737
ning of the Depression (Yin Liangyin, Sichuan canye gaijin shi [History
of silk improvement in Sichuan] [Shanghai: Shangwu yinshu guan,
1947], p. 35), and a low 1952 price. With somewhat different aims
to Bramall, I have adopted a somewhat higher output estimate, and
also a price from the 1920s (see Chen Ciyu, Jindai Zhongguo de jixie
saosi gongye (1860±1945) [China's modern silk reeling industry,
1860±1945] [Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiu yuan jindaishi yanjiu suo,
1989], p. 200). As a result, my table gives a substantially larger role
to silk in the total economy than does Bramall.
Tong oil
It seems to me that Bramall used an output ®gure for tong oil but a
price ®gure for tong nuts. This leads to an understating of the import-
ance of the trade for the economy as a whole. (Again we note that
for Bramall, tong oil, which was Sichuan'sÐand China'sÐmajor legal
export in the 1930s accounted for under 0.1 per cent of provincial
product.)
Matches
I have preferred the National Economic Commission's estimate (see
Quanguo jingi weiyuanhui, Huochai gongye baogao (Report on the
match industry) [Shanghai: Quanguo jingji weiyuanhui, 1935], p.
29) for production in the 1930s to the 1942 ®gure used by Bramall.
This gives a production of 40,000 cases, rather than 48,000, but
that is not an important difference. While the same source gives a
Chongqing cost of production, I use the Shanghai price, which is
more likely to be consistent with the Liu-Yeh prices (where there is
no price for matches); see Shanghai jingji yanjiu suo, Shanghai jiefang
qianhou wujia,p .285.
Services
Bramall uses a national proportion (31.7%) from Liu and Yeh for
this item, but admits it is too high. I rather choose Yeh's later calcu-
lation (also national) of a 25.5% share for services, transport andTIM WRIGHT 738
communications and construction; see Yeh, `China's National
Income, 1931±36', p. 107.
I have used Bramall's methodology to develop similar ®gures for
Yun-Gui. It should be stressed that the output ®gures are even more
incomplete and questionable than those for Sichuan. Output ®gures
come from the following sources: Zhang, Yunnan jingji,K 30±42; Xu,
Zhongguo jindai nongye shengchan ji maoyi, passim; Chinese Economic Bul-
letin, April 1934;T o Ãkyo Ã sho Ãko Ã kaigijo, Shina keizai nempo Ã, pp. 611±12;
Xingzheng yuan nongcun fuxing weiyuanhuui, Yunnan sheng nongcun
diaocha (Investigation of rural villages in Yunnan) (Shanghai:
Shangwu shuju, 1935), p. 68; Akamatsu Shina kakusho Ã keizai jijo Ã, vol.
2, passim; China, Maritõ Âme Customs, Decennial Reports 1922±1931
(Shanghai: Inspectorate General of Customs, 1933), vol. 2, pp. 348±
9; Jiang Dexue, Guizhou jindai jingji shi ziliao xuanji (Selection of mat-
erials on the modern economic history of Guizhou) (Chengdu:
Sichuan shehui kexue yuan chuban she, 1987), pp. 173±6, 243;
Second Historical Archives, 422(2)/1495: Guizhou crop estimates,
1934.
I have used the same prices as for Sichuan.